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CASE NOTE
Trade Regulation—Section S (b) of the Clayton Act—Tolling the
Statute of Limitations During an FTC Proceeding.—Laitram Corp.
v. Deepsouth Packing Co. 1—Laitram Corporation brought this action
against Deepsouth Packing Company in the United States District Court
for infringing patents on shrimp processing machinery. This machinery made
it commercially feasible to process the variety of shrimp found in the Pacific
Northwest and which are far smaller than the Gulf Coast variety. 2 Laitram
had obtained its patents in 1947 and had entered into leasing agreements
with various processors. However, it charged the processors of the Pacific
Northwest twice the rental rate charged to processors in the Gulf Coast
states.3
By 1957 Laitram had a competitor, Deepsouth, which was using and
marketing similar machinery.' Laitram sued both Deepsouth and its presi-
dent, Raphael Skrmetta, for infringement. In the 1957 action Deepsouth
counterclaimed for damages arising from Laitram's alleged violation of the
Sherman Act. 2 While the 1957 action is not reported, other litigation be-
tween Laitram and various lessees of the Skrmetta machinery involved
charges of restraint of trade and monopolization under Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act resulting from Laitram's discriminatory pricing policies.°
It can reasonably be inferred that Deepsouth alleged similar violations in its
counterclaim. The 1957 suit was settled by agreement on March 28, 1967, 7
with a stipulation that the antitrust counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice.
Such a dismissal was filed with the court. 2
In the current infringement suit, Deepsouth filed a motion for leave to
amend its answer by adding a counterclaim for damages arising from alleged
violations of the Sherman Act.° Laitram challenged this motion on the grounds
1 279 F. Supp. 883 (ED. La. 1968).
2 The shrimp found in the Northwest are half the size of the shrimp found in the
Gulf Coast States. Prior to the invention of Laitram's machinery, all shrimp were
processed by hand labor. Since it took the same amount of labor to process each
shrimp regardless of size, the amount of labor expended in the Gulf Coast would
produce twice the poundage of shrimp as could be produced in the Northwest. Thus, it
was commercially impossible for the Northwest shrimp to be marketed because the
labor cost was twice as great as the corresponding cost in the Gulf Coast States. See
LaPeyre v. FTC, .366 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 1966).
3 Id. at 120. Laitram is the successor in interest of the LaPeyre family which
obtained the patents on the machinery, and also of. the Peelers Company which was a
partnership through which the LaPeyre family conducted their business.
4 See Grand Caillou Packing Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
16,927, at 21,989 (FTC 1964).
5 See 279 F. Supp. at 885-86.
6 E.g., Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Crown Packers,
Inc. v. LaPeyre, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab,
Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
7 See 279 F. Supp. at 886.
8 Id.
o Id. at 885. The violations complained of were substantially the same as the
ones in the 1957 action. Id. at 889. The court felt that it was unnecessary to reach the
res judicata issue. Id. at 891.
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that the four-year statute of limitations under Section 4B of the Clayton
Act" had run and that therefore Deepsouth is barred from asserting anti-
trust violations.
Deepsouth contended that the statute of limitations had been tolled
under Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act 11 by virtue of a Federal Trade Com-
mission action against Laitram, instituted May 13, 1960, and decided Sep-
tember 13, 1966. 12 The FTC had challenged Laitram's discriminatory pric-
ing policies as a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
and had issued a cease-and-desist order. Thus, Deepsouth sought damages
for an alleged violation of the Sherman Act that occurred sometime after
May 13, 1956, four years prior to the start of the FTC action, claiming that
the FTC action tolled the statute of limitations until September 13, 1967,
one year after the conclusion of the FTC action. The court HELD: Deep-
south may not amend its answer to include antitrust violations" because
the four-year statute of limitations had run; the FTC action against Laitram
under Section 5 of the FTC Act did not toll the statute. 14
Section 4B of the Clayton Act provides a four-year statute of limitations
on any private suit to recover damages under the antitrust laws. 15 Section
5 (b) of the Clayton Act tolls this statute of limitations in behalf of priviate
litigants whenever a civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United
States Government under the antitrust laws." The statute is tolled during
the pendency of the Government's case and for one year thereafter. The
antitrust laws are defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act 17 to be: the Sher-
man Anti-Trust Act," Sections 73-77 of the Wilson Act, 19 the 1913 Amend-
ments to Sections 73-76 of the Wilson Act 2° and the Clayton Act. 21 This
10 "Any action to enforce any cause of action under sections 15 or 15a of this
title shall forever be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of
action accrued." 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1964).
11 Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws . . . the
running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action
arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter com-
plained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter . . . .
Id. § 16(b).
12 Grand Caillou Packing Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder' Trade Reg. Rep.
V 16,927, at 21,955 (FTC 1964).
13 A challenge to a motion for leave to amend based upon res judicata or the
statute of limitations is generally considered only after the proposed motions have
been filed, but the court felt it would be more expedient and a better rule to allow the
substantive challenge before the amendments were filed. 279 F. Supp. at 887.
14 The court held that the statute of limitations starts to run from the time the
action could first have been brought and that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages
for all injuries incurred within four years from the time the action was actually
brought. Id. at 887-89.
15 See note 10 supra.
16 See note 11 supra.
14 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
la Id. §§ 1-7 .
19 Id. II 8-11.
20 Id.
21 Id. §§ 12-27 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964).
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definition was enacted in 1914 and has not changed although changes have
been made in Section 5 of the Clayton Act.
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act allows a private party in a treble dam-
age suit to introduce as prima facie evidence any final judgment or decree
obtained by the United States Government under the Antitrust laws. 22
Originally section 5 (b) was thought to be dependent upon section 5(a); the
statute of limitations could be tolled only in an action which would produce
a decree or judgment admissible as prima facie evidence under Section 5(a)
of the Act.23
The courts held FTC proceedings inadmissible under section 5(a) for
two reasons. The orders issued by the FTC were considered merely as notice
of a violation and not as a final judgment or decree since FTC orders were
not enforceable without judicial action. 24 This disability was cured in 1959
by the Finality Act25 which made FTC orders final unless appealed within
60 days. The second reason was the administrative nature of the proceedings.
The courts interpreted Section 5 of the Clayton Act to encompass only judi-
cial actions brought by the Department of Justice. 26 FTC actions were con-
sidered brought on behalf of an administrative agency and not the United
States Government.22 Thus, FTC proceedings were originally held not to toll
the statute under any circumstances.
In 1956, the Supreme Court, in the case of Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,28 decided that sections 5(a) and
5(b) were independent and that an FTC proceeding under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act 2° tolled the statute of limitations 3 0 The Court concluded
that, while section 5(b) may have been a supplement to section 5(a) when
enacted, it was not limited to that effect now, nor was there an express
showing of congressional intent to that effects' In determining the actual,
though unexpressed, intent of Congress, the Court examined, "the purposes
and policies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the
remedial scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the
Act."32 The Court found the policy behind the statute was "the clearly ex-
pressed desire that private parties be permitted the benefits of prior govern-
ment actions"33 in order to assist the private enforcement of antitrust policy.
The Court therefore concluded that it was the intention of Congress to
22 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
23 As originally passed, Section 5 of the Clayton Act was not divided into sub-
sections. The division was a result of the 1955 amendments to the Act and section 5
now contains two provisions.
24 E.g., Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc., 295 F. 729, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1923).
25 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(c), (g) (1964).
26 E.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 223 F. Supp. 712, 713
(ED. Tenn. 1963).
27 See, e.g., Farmington Dowell Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967,
973 (D. Me. 1963).
28 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
29 15 U.S.C. 	 18 (1964).
30 381 U.S. at 321-22.
31 Id. at 319.
32 Id. at 321.
33 Id. at 320.
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allow the statute of limitations to be tolled by an FTC proceeding since
tolling would be an invaluable aid to private litigants. 34
Another reason for the Supreme Court's decision was that the FTC
was proceeding under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 35 There is concurrent
jurisdiction between the Department of Justice and the FTC to enforce this
section. If the Justice Department had brought the action there would be
no question that the statute of limitations was tolled. The Court concluded
that it was unfair for the rights of a private litigant to be determined solely
by which government agency had brought the action."
The main difference between the Minnesota Mining case and the case
at hand is the statutory basis for the FTC action. The action against Laitram
was under Section 5 of the FTC Act. 37 That act is not one of the antitrust
laws, as defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act. This is the basis of the
holding in the instant case; a proceeding solely under the FTC Act does not
toll the statute whereas a proceeding by the FTC under the Clayton Act
does."' The statutory basis for the proceeding is controlling rather than the
particular agency that institutes the proceeding.
While this distinction is consistent with the language of the statute, it
is in conflict with the actual machinery used to combat antitrust violations.
Distinguishing between actions brought by the FTC under the Clayton Act
and actions brought by the FTC under the unfair-methods-of-competition
clause of Section 5 of the FTC Act3° presupposes different offenses being
enumerated in each act
When enacted in 1914 the FTC Act may have been conceived as a broad,
inclusive prohibition against practices not enumerated in the Sherman
Act. 4° However, the Supreme Court, in 1920,  interpreted the unfair-
methods clause of section 5 to include only established violations of either
the Sherman or Clayton Acts.41 Thus, this part of section 5 became coexten-
sive with the Sherman and Clayton Acts. This created a dual system of
enforcing• the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice could prosecute
violations arising under either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. The FTC, in
addition to its direct statutory authority to prosecute violations of Sections
2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act, 42 could prosecute any other violations of
the Clayton Act or any violation of the Sherman Act under Section 5 of the
FTC Act. While today, the unfair-methods clause of section 5 reaches
activities outside the coverage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 43 it still
34 Id.
35 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
36 381 U.S. at 322.
37 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
38 279 F. Supp. at 891.
39 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964). Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, also gives
the FTC power to prosecute "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce." Id.
This note deals with the violations prosecuted under the unfair-methods clause of § 5
or those cases where it is impossible to tell under which section the FTC is acting.
49 The FTC Act was passed before the Clayton Act. The FTC Act on September
26, 1914, 38 Stat. 719, and the Clayton Act on October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730.
41 FTC v. Gratz, 253 'U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1964).
43 E.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966).
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encompasses all Sherman and Clayton Act violations so that the dual
nature of antitrust enforcement continues.
The situations presented by the Minnesota Mining case and the instant
case are not really dissimilar. Just as it is unfair to prejudice a private liti-
gant's rights by refusing to toll the statute when the FTC acts under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, it is equally unfair to refuse to toll the statute when
the FTC acts under Section 5 of the FTC Act if the substantive violation
is also a violation of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Under the dual
system of enforcement of antitrust law, a private party should not lose any
benefits because conduct , is challenged by the FTC under section 5 rather
than by the Department of Justice under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
Ideally, it would seem that a proceeding brought by the FTC under
Section 5 of the FTC Act should toll the statute of limitations whenever the
conduct in question could have been prosecuted by the Justice Department
as a violation of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. In practice, however,
such a rule would be unworkable. It is often impossible to tell at the outset
if a practice later found to violate Section 5 of the FTC Act also violates
the Sherman or Clayton Acts. Since section 5 is broader than the Sherman
or Clayton Acts, the FTC, and the courts, when considering violations of
section 5, need only determine that given conduct violates section 5, without
having to reach the question whether a violation of the Sherman or Clayton
acts has also been committed.
A good example of the difficulty presented may be found in the present
case. Laitram's practice of leasing its patented machinery to processors in
the Northwest at twice the rate charged processors on the Gulf Coast was
challenged by the FTC as a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 44 The
majority of the Commission, in finding a violation only of section 5, pointed
to the possible existence of agreements between Laitram, Grand Caillou
Packing Company and other Gulf Coast processors to give the Gulf Coast
processors an advantage over processors in the Northwest. 45 This conduct,
if proved by a private litigant would be a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act which proscribes contracts, combinations and conspiracies that
are in restraint of trade.46 In addition, Commissioner Elman, in his con-
curring opinion, found Laitram's activity to be a violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act which prohibits anyone from monopolizing any part of trade
or commerce. 47 The Fifth Circuit in affirming the FTC order" did not
consider the question whether Laitram violated the Sherman Act but was
satisfied that a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act had occurred.
Other litigation involving the same conduct by Laitram adds to the
problem. In two treble damage actions brought in another district court,
Laitram has been found guilty of violating Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 49
44 Grand Caillou Packing Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
11 16,927, at 21,955 (FTC 1964).
45 Id. at 21,988.
46 15 	 § 1 (1964).
47 Id. § 2.
48 LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
49 Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Crown Packers,
Inc. v. LaPeyre, 260 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966).
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Yet a different district court, however, has found Laitram not to have violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, although that court did find that Laitram
had misused its patents. 5°
Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that Laitram's leasing practices
violate the Sherman Act nor can it be said that these practices do not
violate the Sherman Act. Yet it has been established that these practices do
violate Section 5 of the FTC Act. With respect to such cases, where the
activity challenged by the FTC is not clearly a violation of either the
Sherman or Clayton Acts, it will be necessary to determine whether the
policy considerations behind Section 5 (b) of the Clayton Act require the
statute of limitations to be tolled whenever the FTC acts pursuant to
Section 5 of the FTC Act.
As enunciated by the Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining, the basic
policy behind Section 5 (b) of the Clayton Act is to aid the enforcement of
antitrust policy by giving the private litigant as great a benefit as possible
from government proceedings. 51 These benefits "flow as naturally from
Commission proceedings as they do from Justice Department actions." 52 The
information gathered by the FTC could prove an invaluable aid in deter-
mining whether a violation has been committed that would sustain a treble
damage action inasmuch as the rules of the FTC require that information
such as pleadings, motions, transcripts of hearings and testimony, exhibits
and documents be made available to private litigants. 53
Tolling the statute of limitations in all cases under Section 5 of the
FTC Act would necessarily result in having the statute tolled in cases where
the challenged conduct was not a violation of either the Sherman or Clayton
Acts. The same result nevertheless can occur when the Justice Department
acts. The Justice Department does not, of course, establish a Sherman or
Clayton Act violation in every action it brings. However, the statute of
limitations is tolled as soon as the Department of Justice brings the action
regardless of the ultimate result.'" The private litigant in such a case still
has the advantage of waiting until the Government's case has concluded in
failure before assessing his own chances for success.
Allowing FTC proceedings pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act to
toll the statute of limitations, while increasing the frequency of the statute
being tolled, should not result in a multiplicity of frivolous suits. The
number of private suits brought is likely to increase, a result which is in
keeping with the policy behind the statute. The substantive grounds for
recovery of treble damages remain unchanged for the tolling provision of
Section 5 of the Clayton Act does not create any new substantive violations.
It merely extends the time during which an action based upon an established
or alleged violation of antitrust policy may be brought.
When the Justice Department loses a case, or settles one before trial,
the private litigant must decide whether he has a good cause of action. This
50 Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965).
51 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
52 381 U.S. at 320.
as 16 C.F.R. § 4.9(e) (4) (1968).
54 See note 11 supra.
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same determination would have to be made by a private litigant whenever
the FTC acts. When the conduct challenged by the FTC appeared unlikely
to fall within the Sherman or Clayton Acts, a private suitor would be less
likely to risk the expense of a suit. By tolling the statute the plaintiff would
be better able to assess his chances on the basis of the information gathered
by the Government. Thus, allowing all FTC proceedings to toll the statute of
limitations should result in private litigants availing themselves of the
benefits of government action almost entirely in cases where the conduct
challenged by the FTC appears to be a violation of either the Sherman or
Clayton Acts.
The policy objectives behind Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act indicate
that FTC proceedings should toll the statute of limitations whenever the
FTC acts under Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, it may not be possible
to implement such a rule without legislative assistance from Congress. As
noted, the definition of the antitrust laws found in Section 1 of the Clayton
Act does not include the FTC Act. Before a court can hold that proceedings
under Section 5 of the FTC Act toll the statute of limitations it will be
necessary to read Section 5 of the FTC Act into the Clayton Act's definition
of the antitrust laws as the term is used in Section 5(b) of the Act. While
this might be accomplished by the courts on the basis that it was a legisla-
tive oversight to omit Section 5 of the FTC Act from the meaning given the
term "antitrust laws" in Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act, such a result would
seem to be no less than judicial legislation, and it is understandable why the
court in the instant case refused to toll the statute.
WILLIAM H. BLUTH
1084
